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RETHINKING INTERVENTION IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
CARL TOBIAS* 
Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm 
(Environmental Paradigm) substantially enhances understanding of 
intervention in federal environmental disputes.1 These controversies are a 
critical type of modern civil lawsuit and perhaps constitute the quintessential 
form of public law litigation. Professor Peter Appel comprehensively reviews 
the lengthy history of the intervention mechanism, scrutinizes the substantial 
1966 revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, and closely examines 
the phenomenon of public law litigation and intervention in it. 
Professor Appel finds that federal district court judges liberally grant 
requests to intervene in these cases, although he asserts that some legal 
scholars have criticized trial judges for narrowly applying intervention in 
environmental cases and for underestimating the contributions that 
intervention applicants can make to resolution of these lawsuits.2 Professor 
Appel's observations lead him to suggest that appellate and district courts 
rethink intervention in environmental litigation. Professor Appel urges that 
the courts of appeals, which now review district court intervention decisions 
de novo, instead use an abuse of discretion standard.3 Moreover, he suggests 
that district judges depart from trans-substantive application of Rule 24 and 
employ amicus curiae involvement as a substitute for intervention ofright.4 
Professor Appel, thus, significantly advances the dialogue about public 
law cases and intervention in them and much that he states is undisputed. 
Nevertheless, certain aspects of his article are controversial; therefore, 
Environmental Paradigm warrants a response. This piece undertakes that 
effort. I essentially afford a friendly critique, which emphasizes several 
important ways that Professor Appel and I differ and suggests how Professor 
Appel's helpful analysis might be elaborated. My thesis is that we need a 
better understanding of the history, theory, policy, and practice of 
environmental litigation and of intervention in it. Until our comprehension of 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish 
to thank Annette Appell, Jay Bybee, Chris Bryant, Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable 
suggestions, Angela Dufva for processing this piece and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. 
Errors that remain are mine. 
1. Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 215 (2000). 
2. See id. at n.10. I am one of those scholars. 
3. See id. at nn.438-41 and accompanying text 
4. See id. at nn. 449-60 and accompanying text 
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these matters is more refined, it will remain difficult to articulate with 
confidence the best prescriptions for the issues raised by intervention. 
I. EMPIRICAL DATA ON ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND 
INTERVENTION 
First, and perhaps foremost, we need to improve understanding of modem 
environmental litigation and of the role of intervention in it. Judges, 
attorneys, and legal scholars participate in too much speculation premised on 
anecdotes and impressions as well as reliance on appellate and district court 
intervention decisionmaking in environmental cases which have appeared in 
federal reporters or are available online. For example, Professor Appel 
apparently assumes that intervention is granted too freely and that successful 
applicants consume more time than is warranted,5 while other federal court 
observers, including me, presume that intervention decisionmaking is overly 
restrictive and that those pennitted to intervene will make substantial 
contributions. 6 The truth probably lies somewhere in between. 
Systematically collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing empirical data is 
critical when considering the institution of changes as fundamental as those 
suggested by Professor Appel. 7 It is also important to realize that certain 
aspects of this analysis will defy precise empirical verification. At some 
juncture, the inquiry will devolve into value judgments and even speculation. 
For instance, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the value of the 
contributions that an applicant denied intervention might have made, 
particularly identifying cause-effect linkages between the input foregone and 
substantive judicial decisionmaking. Similar problems attend efforts to 
determine how much applicants granted intervention delay dispute resolution 
and improve judicial decisionmaking.8 
Some of this information may be readily available because it already 
exists in the information systems of the Federal Judicial Center, the 
5. See id. at text accompanying n.426. 
6. See, e.g., Emma Coleman Jones, Problems and Prospects of Participation in Ajfim1ative 
Action Litigation: A Role/or lntervenors, 13 U.C. DAVISL. REY. 221 (1980); Carl Tobias, Public Law 
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REY. 270 (1989); see also Appel, 
supra note 1, at n.10. 
7. For articulation of this idea in a related context, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transfonnatlon 
of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule I J, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989); 
Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Re.form far Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
455, 455-59 (1993). 
8. It is also important to recognize that delay attributable to helpful intervenor contributions 
should not be considered detrimental. For more discussion of these ideas, see Carl Tobias, Standing to 
Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REY. 415, 446-53. 
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Administrative Office of the United States Courts, or specific appellate or 
district courts. More, and ostensibly better, material probably exists in the 
case files of individual environmental lawsuits. It might be useful to 
assemble this material, especially the information collected from appellate or 
district courts. For example, evaluators could compare appeals in circuits 
which apply the de novo and the abuse of discretion standards. Assessors 
might also consult cases in districts with diverse or representative dockets. 
More specifically, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia should receive consideration because it hears so many appeals 
from administrative agency decisions involving the environment, while 
individual districts in the West may warrant analysis, as those courts resolve 
numerous cases implicating public lands, natural resources, and endangered 
species. 
II. APPRECIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
We need a more refined understanding of modern environmental 
litigation, particularly comprehension that is differentiated rather than 
monolithic. Professor Appel does describe numerous types of environmental 
lawsuits, although Environmental Paradigm appears to treat these actions as 
if they were comparatively similar. 
There is much difference between an appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit of a regulation promulgated by 
the Environmental Protection Agency in an Administrative Procedure Act 
notice and comment rulemaking proceeding that involves the Clean Air Act 
and an appeal to a federal district court of a Forest Service decision 
authorizing a timber sale on a specific national forest. However, these are 
simply examples of the kinds of lawsuits that can arise at the polar extremes 
of environmental litigation, which ranges across a very broad spectrum. 
Factors which may affect the litigation include the substantive basis of the 
case, the party structure, the underlying substantive and procedural decisions 
that are at issue, and the interests implicated by the litigation. More 
specifically, is the litigation premised on the Constitution or a statute? If it is 
based on legislation, what is the statutory purpose: pollution control, 
environmental or species protection, or public lands preservation? Who are 
the parties and the intervention applicants; what is the nature of the interest 
which they seek to vindicate, and how does that interest implicate relevant 
statutes? Is plaintiff, defendant, or the intervention applicant a governmental 
agency, a private individual or entity, or a ''public interest litigant?" Does the 
appeal arise from an agency rulemaking, adjudicatory proceeding, or related 
governmental action or inaction or involve private activity? In short, we need 
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an understanding of environmental litigation that is at once broader and more 
refined, and an appreciation that this form of modern lawsuit is not 
monolithic.9 
In most situations, the touchstone of analysis will be the purpose of the 
environmental statute which underlies the litigation, and how this purpose 
relates to the interest requirement for intervention. The statutory purpose is 
the modem-day equivalent of the claim to private property which most easily 
satisfied the original Federal Rule 24. Congress generally intends 
environmental legislation to protect the environment from injury or to 
preserve certain environmental values, although some statutes, especially 
those prescribing pollution control, recognize that the interest in protecting 
the environment is to be balanced with the usually economic interests of the 
individuals and entities that the environmental regulation or protection 
directly affects. Ascertaining these statutory purposes requires careful 
scrutiny of the language and the applicable legislative history to discern 
congressional intent. 
III. A WORD ABOUT PRESCRIPTIONS 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that Environmental Paradigm 
affords an accurate descriptive account of intervention in modern 
environmental cases, the article's prescriptions warrant evaluation. Even if 
Professor Appel correctly surmises that appellate courts review district court 
intervention decisionmaking too rigorously, trial judges grant intervention 
too liberally, and interests permitted to intervene impose substantial burdens 
on parties and courts, particularly vis-a-vis their contributions, 10 his proposals 
deserve analysis. 
Environmental Paradigm recommends that appellate courts, which now 
employ de novo review of trial court intervention decisionmaking, substitute 
abuse of discretion review.11 The article invokes Judge Henry Friendly's 
admonition in Hooker Chemicals that appeals court judges defer to district 
judges who have the "feel of the case."12 Questioning the preeminent 
appellate judge of a generation is always treacherous.13 However, this view 
9. For general examples of the specific type of analysis that I am suggesting, see To bins, supra 
note 6, at 279-83; Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L. 
REY. 745, 754-57 (1987). 
10. See Appel, supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.449-60. 
11. See id. at nn.438-41 and accompanying text 
12. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F. 2d 968, 991 (2d Cir. 1984); see also 
Appel, supra note 1, at n.443 and accompanying text 
13. See Paul Freund, In Memoriam: HenryJ. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1720 (1986); see 
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vests substantial authority in a single decisionmaker, who may already be 
overburdened by an enormous caseload and who may be considering the 
petition of an applicant that is politically unpopular, has scarce resources, or 
apparently promises to complicate or prolong already complex or lengthy 
litigation.14 The abuse of discretion standard, thus, may simply place too 
much trust in the discretion of one individual decisionmaker. 
Professor Appel also suggests that district courts apply a non-trans-
substantive approach to Rule 24.15 The history of the provision's 1966 
amendment and of subsequent passage of major environmental statutes can 
support this position, 16 while Judge Friendly trenchantly stated that the 
Rule's intervention requirements must be read "in the context of the 
particular statutory scheme that is the basis for the litigation.17 For example, 
judges could consider the congressional purposes in adopting the substantive 
legislation that underlies the litigation when resolving intervention requests. 
If courts follow this approach, they may well grant intervention more 
liberally than in the past because many intervention applicants arguably seek 
participation to vindicate the statutory purposes, which generally relate to 
protection of the environment. 
Environmental Paradigm also proposes that district judges employ 
amicus curiae involvement as a substitute for intervention of right. 18 This 
approach seems inadvisable for several reasons. First, the successful 
intervention applicant enjoys party status, which bestows rights, such as the 
ability to participate in discovery and to cross-examine witnesses, which an 
amicus does not.19 Amici have traditionally contributed input to the appellate 
process on legal issues, rather than factual ones. 20 Some modem 
environmental litigation involves only legal questions, but more of these 
cases implicate factual disputes and a number are fact-intensive. The 
also Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982). 
14. For discussion of these ideas in a related context, see Carl Tobias, Rule I I and Civil Right 
Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 495-98 (1988-89) 
15. See Appel, supra note 1, at n.448 and accompanying text; see also Robert M. Cover, For 
James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALEL.J. 718, 718 (1975). 
16. The 1966 revision's drafting was essentially concluded in 1962, before the passage of every 
major modern environmental statute. The drafters evinced contemporaneous appreciation of civil 
rights litigation, however, and intimated that they wrote the revision with this form of public Jaw 
litigation in mind while apparently contemplating that judges would flexibly and pragmatically apply 
the new provision to facilitate these cases. See Tobias, supra note 8, at 430-431. 
17. Hooker Chemicals, 749 F.2d at 983. 
18. See Appel, supra note 1, at nn.449-60 and accompanying text 
19. Compare FED. R. C!V. P. 24(a)(2) with FED. R. APP. P. 29. See generally 9A C. WRIGHT & 
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROC.§ 3975 (1999). 
20. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19. But see STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN 
THEFEDERALJUDICIALSYSTEM 110-11 (2d ed. 1984). 
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comparatively limited experience with amicus participation in trial court 
litigation may also mean that its use is not well understood in this context. 
For instance, it remains unclear how much attention, if any, district judges 
accord the input of amici. 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LmGATION As PARADIGMATIC PUBLIC LAW 
LmGATION 
Despite Professor Appel's careful treatment of environmental litigation 
and of intervention in it and notwithstanding his article's title, Environmental 
Paradigm clings too substantially to a private law view of environmental 
litigation and participation in it. As the twenty-first century opens, it is 
simply too late in the day to consider environmental cases as bipolar disputes 
between two private parties or to emphasize the speed with which courts 
resolve cases and the litigation expenses that intervenors impose on parties.21 
Many factors compel a more public perception of environmental litigation. 
Plaintiffs typically base these lawsuits on federal statutes, which are intended 
to protect the environment and they seek to vindicate important interests that 
affect the public. Moreover, the Advisory Committee, in drafting the 1966 
revision of Rule 24, intended to depart from the view that private property 
could best satisfy the interest requirement in the provision. 22 The Committee 
intended judges to apply the intervention device flexibly and pragmatically 
and evinced some cognizance of public law litigation and of intervention in 
it. Subsequent congressional passage of environmental statutes whose 
principal purpose was to protect the environment and on which 
environmental litigation is premised further reinforces this public law 
perspective on the litigation and intervention in it 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental Paradigm substantially improves comprehension of public 
law litigation and intervention in environmental disputes. Certain aspects of 
Professor Appel's analysis are controversial or warrant elaboration, however. 
Supplementation of his valuable contribution would advance understanding 
of this critical form of modern public law litigation and of the valuable 
intervention device. 
21. For helpful articulation of these ideas, see Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of 
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REY. 1432 (1988). 
22. I rely in the remainder of this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 8, at 430-31. 
